Nash equilibria of a generic networking game with applications to circuit-switched networks

Youngmi Jin, George Kesidis

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A generic mechanism for end-user transmission rate control into a differentiated services Internet is formulated and basic results of corresponding Nash equilibria are proved. We consider specific examples of the mechanism including additive increase and multiplicative decrease inspired by present day TCP congestion control. For the example of users sharing access to a bandwidth resource via resizable provisioned label-switched paths (MPLS), we study the equilibria and the performance of the generic mechanism and give analytical results on convergence to equilibria. The fairness of the resulting equilibria when user demands exceed available network resources is also studied.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1242-1249
Number of pages8
JournalProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
Volume2
StatePublished - Aug 29 2003
Event22nd Annual Joint Conference on the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies - San Francisco, CA, United States
Duration: Mar 30 2003Apr 3 2003

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Switching networks
Labels
Internet
Bandwidth
Networks (circuits)

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

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Nash equilibria of a generic networking game with applications to circuit-switched networks. / Jin, Youngmi; Kesidis, George.

In: Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM, Vol. 2, 29.08.2003, p. 1242-1249.

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

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