Notes on financial system development and political intervention

Fenghua Song, Anjan Thakor, John E. Simon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the impact of political intervention on a financial system that consists of banks and financial markets and develops over time. In this financial system, banks and markets exhibit three forms of interaction: they compete, they complement each other, and they co-evolve. Co-evolution is generated by two new ingredients of financial system architecture relative to the existing theories: securitization and risk-sensitive bank capital. We show that securitization propagates banking advances to the financial market, permitting market evolution to be driven by bank evolution, and market advances are transmitted to banks through bank capital. We then examine how politicians determine the nature of political intervention designed to expand credit availability. We find that political intervention in banking exhibits a U-shaped pattern, where it is most notable in the early stage of financial system development (through bank capital subsidy in exchange for state ownership of banks) and in the advanced stage (through direct lending regulation). Despite expanding credit access, political intervention results in an increase in financial system risk and does not contribute to financial system evolution. Numerous policy implications are drawn out.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article numberlhs011
Pages (from-to)491-513
Number of pages23
JournalWorld Bank Economic Review
Volume27
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2013

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political intervention
financial system
system development
bank
financial market
banking
market
credit
coevolution
ownership
Financial system
System development
lending
subsidy
politician
regulation
Bank capital

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Development
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Song, Fenghua ; Thakor, Anjan ; Simon, John E. / Notes on financial system development and political intervention. In: World Bank Economic Review. 2013 ; Vol. 27, No. 3. pp. 491-513.
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Notes on financial system development and political intervention. / Song, Fenghua; Thakor, Anjan; Simon, John E.

In: World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 27, No. 3, lhs011, 01.10.2013, p. 491-513.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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