Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions

Robert C. Marshall, Michael J. Meurer, Jean Francois Richard, Walter Stromquist

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

108 Scopus citations


We propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions. The heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude. Bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases. Extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, C63, C72, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)193-220
Number of pages28
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - Sep 1994


All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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