Oligopolistic competition, product variety, entry deterrence, and technology transfer

Jonathan Eaton, Henryk Kierzkowski

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

This article develops a model of industrial structure and product variety when tastes are diffuse and when a firm must incur a fixed cost and design a product before producing. Pricing and output decisions occur subsequently. While standard Cournot-Nash and Bertrand-Nash equilibrium concepts typically fail to identify a unique equilibrium among a given set of Producers, consistent conjectures determine a unique equilibrium. One aspect of this equilibrium is that consumers typically benefit from having majority tastes.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)99-107
Number of pages9
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Volume15
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1984

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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