On a truthful mechanism for expiring spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks

Shabnam Sodagari, Alireza Attar, Sven G. Bilén

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study how truthfulness can be enforced as a dominant strategy when a number of secondary cognitive radios participate in an online expiring spectrum sharing auction, held by the primary to lease its spectrum holes. The types of secondary cognitive radios, announced to the primary, are composed of valuation and arrivaldeparture periods. We show how, by the suitable choice of channel allocation and pricing schemes, the collusion incentive among secondary cognitive radios can be reduced. The performance of the deployed dynamic auction is compared with that of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) offline auction as a benchmark.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number5738227
Pages (from-to)856-865
Number of pages10
JournalIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Volume29
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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