On delays in project completion with cost reduction: An experiment

Shubhro Sarkar, Anthony M. Kwasnica

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We examine the voluntary provision of a public project via binary contributions when contributions may be made over multiple periods. In many situations, early contributors are likely to pay a higher cost than those who wait. We show that in such circumstances the provision of the project always involves delay. Because this game involves coordination on complex, dynamic strategies in the face of asymmetries in payoffs, we examine behavior in the laboratory.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)557-584
Number of pages28
JournalSouthern Economic Journal
Volume77
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2011

    Fingerprint

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this