On manipulablity of random serial dictatorship in sequential matching with dynamic preferences

Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson, Robin Cohen

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    6 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    We consider the problem of repeatedly matching a set of alternatives to a set of agents in the absence of monetary transfer. We propose a generic framework for evaluating sequential matching mechanisms with dynamic preferences, and show that unlike single-shot settings, the random serial dictatorship mechanism is manipulable.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
    PublisherAI Access Foundation
    Pages4168-4169
    Number of pages2
    ISBN (Electronic)9781577357049
    StatePublished - Jun 1 2015
    Event29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015 - Austin, United States
    Duration: Jan 25 2015Jan 30 2015

    Publication series

    NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
    Volume6

    Other

    Other29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
    CountryUnited States
    CityAustin
    Period1/25/151/30/15

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Software
    • Artificial Intelligence

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