TY - GEN
T1 - On the Robustness of Domain Constraints
AU - Sheatsley, Ryan
AU - Hoak, Blaine
AU - Pauley, Eric
AU - Beugin, Yohan
AU - Weisman, Michael J.
AU - McDaniel, Patrick
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors would like to warmly thank the reviewers for their insightful feedback and Quinn Burke for his feedback on versions of this paper. This research was sponsored by the Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory and was accomplished under Cooperative Agreement Number W911NF-13-2-0045 (ARL Cyber Security CRA). The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes not withstanding any copyright notation here on. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CNS-1805310. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 ACM.
PY - 2021/11/12
Y1 - 2021/11/12
N2 - Machine learning is vulnerable to adversarial examples - inputs designed to cause models to perform poorly. However, it is unclear if adversarial examples represent realistic inputs in the modeled domains. Diverse domains such as networks and phishing have domain constraints - complex relationships between features that an adversary must satisfy for an attack to be realized (in addition to any adversary-specific goals). In this paper, we explore how domain constraints limit adversarial capabilities and how adversaries can adapt their strategies to create realistic (constraint-compliant) examples. In this, we develop techniques to learn domain constraints from data, and show how the learned constraints can be integrated into the adversarial crafting process. We evaluate the efficacy of our approach in network intrusion and phishing datasets and find: (1) up to 82% of adversarial examples produced by state-of-the-art crafting algorithms violate domain constraints, (2) domain constraints are robust to adversarial examples; enforcing constraints yields an increase in model accuracy by up to 34%. We observe not only that adversaries must alter inputs to satisfy domain constraints, but that these constraints make the generation of valid adversarial examples far more challenging.
AB - Machine learning is vulnerable to adversarial examples - inputs designed to cause models to perform poorly. However, it is unclear if adversarial examples represent realistic inputs in the modeled domains. Diverse domains such as networks and phishing have domain constraints - complex relationships between features that an adversary must satisfy for an attack to be realized (in addition to any adversary-specific goals). In this paper, we explore how domain constraints limit adversarial capabilities and how adversaries can adapt their strategies to create realistic (constraint-compliant) examples. In this, we develop techniques to learn domain constraints from data, and show how the learned constraints can be integrated into the adversarial crafting process. We evaluate the efficacy of our approach in network intrusion and phishing datasets and find: (1) up to 82% of adversarial examples produced by state-of-the-art crafting algorithms violate domain constraints, (2) domain constraints are robust to adversarial examples; enforcing constraints yields an increase in model accuracy by up to 34%. We observe not only that adversaries must alter inputs to satisfy domain constraints, but that these constraints make the generation of valid adversarial examples far more challenging.
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U2 - 10.1145/3460120.3484570
DO - 10.1145/3460120.3484570
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85119337709
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 495
EP - 515
BT - CCS 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
T2 - 27th ACM Annual Conference on Computer and Communication Security, CCS 2021
Y2 - 15 November 2021 through 19 November 2021
ER -