On the security vulnerabilities of the virtual force approach to mobile sensor deployment

Novella Bartolini, G. Bongiovanni, Thomas F. La Porta, S. Silvestri

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we point out the vulnerabilities of the virtual force approach to mobile sensor deployment, which is at the basis of many deployment algorithms. For the first time in the literature, we show that some attacks significantly hinder the capability of these algorithms to guarantee a satisfactory coverage. An attacker can compromise a few mobile sensors and force them to pursue a malicious purpose by influencing the movement of other legitimate sensors. We make an example of a simple and effective attack, called Opportunistic Movement, and give an analytical study of its efficacy. We also show through simulations that, in a typical scenario, this attack can reduce coverage by more than 50% by compromising a number of nodes as low as the 7%. We propose SecureVF, a virtual force deployment algorithm able to neutralize the above mentioned attack. We show that under SecureVF malicious sensors are detected and then ignored whenever their movement is not compliant with the moving strategy provided by SecureVF. We also investigate the performance of SecureVF through simulations, and compare it to one of the most acknowledged algorithms based on virtual forces. We show that SecureVF enables a remarkably improved coverage of the area of interest, at the expense of a low additional energy consumption.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013
Pages2418-2426
Number of pages9
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2 2013
Event32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013 - Turin, Italy
Duration: Apr 14 2013Apr 19 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
ISSN (Print)0743-166X

Other

Other32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013
CountryItaly
CityTurin
Period4/14/134/19/13

Fingerprint

Sensors
Energy utilization

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Bartolini, N., Bongiovanni, G., La Porta, T. F., & Silvestri, S. (2013). On the security vulnerabilities of the virtual force approach to mobile sensor deployment. In 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013 (pp. 2418-2426). [6567047] (Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM). https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567047
Bartolini, Novella ; Bongiovanni, G. ; La Porta, Thomas F. ; Silvestri, S. / On the security vulnerabilities of the virtual force approach to mobile sensor deployment. 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013. 2013. pp. 2418-2426 (Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM).
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Bartolini, N, Bongiovanni, G, La Porta, TF & Silvestri, S 2013, On the security vulnerabilities of the virtual force approach to mobile sensor deployment. in 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013., 6567047, Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 2418-2426, 32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013, Turin, Italy, 4/14/13. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567047

On the security vulnerabilities of the virtual force approach to mobile sensor deployment. / Bartolini, Novella; Bongiovanni, G.; La Porta, Thomas F.; Silvestri, S.

2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013. 2013. p. 2418-2426 6567047 (Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Bartolini N, Bongiovanni G, La Porta TF, Silvestri S. On the security vulnerabilities of the virtual force approach to mobile sensor deployment. In 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2013. 2013. p. 2418-2426. 6567047. (Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM). https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567047