One-sided matching with dynamic preferences (doctoral consortium)

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    One-sided matching is concerned with the allocation of indivisible objects to a set of agents, in the absence of monetary transfers. In contrast to many real-life scenarios such as shift scheduling or course assignment, traditional matching mechanisms assume that agents precisely know their preferences. However, preferences over alternatives may change over time due to idiosyncratic reasons or as a function of earlier outcomes. My research focuses on the theoretical investigation of dynamic matching markets, along with the experimental study of various matching mechanisms in such dynamic environments. In particular, I design and analyze truthful sequential mechanisms in settings with dynamic ordinal preferences to further elucidate a principled approach to decision making in dynamic models of resource allocation and fill the current gap between stochastic reasoning models and the game-theoretical elements of the matching theory.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationAAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
    EditorsRafael H. Bordini, Pinar Yolum, Edith Elkind, Gerhard Weiss
    PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
    Pages2005-2006
    Number of pages2
    ISBN (Electronic)9781450337717
    StatePublished - 2015
    Event14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015 - Istanbul, Turkey
    Duration: May 4 2015May 8 2015

    Publication series

    NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
    Volume3
    ISSN (Print)1548-8403
    ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

    Other

    Other14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015
    Country/TerritoryTurkey
    CityIstanbul
    Period5/4/155/8/15

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Artificial Intelligence
    • Software
    • Control and Systems Engineering

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