Optimal incentive design for distributed stabilizing control of nonlinear dynamic networks

Hunmin Kim, Minghui Zhu

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    In many dynamic networks, control authorities seek for heterogeneous and even partially conflicting subobjectives. The misaligned interests threaten reliability of dynamic networks and degrade their operating performance. In this paper, we focus on design and analysis of mechanisms where a system operator provides a reward to incentivize control authorities to implement distributed stabilizing controllers. The proposed mechanisms are based on a bidding scheme where the bid of each control authority is represented by a newly derived local stability index. The mechanism induces a non-cooperative game between local control authorities while minimizing disclosures of their private information. By perturbing the game, we design an optimal incentive mechanism where the system operator can ensure network-wide stability and simultaneously maximize a social welfare while minimizing the reward size and perturbations.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publication54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015
    PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
    Pages2289-2294
    Number of pages6
    ISBN (Electronic)9781479978861
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Feb 8 2015
    Event54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2015 - Osaka, Japan
    Duration: Dec 15 2015Dec 18 2015

    Publication series

    NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
    Volume54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015
    ISSN (Print)0743-1546

    Other

    Other54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2015
    CountryJapan
    CityOsaka
    Period12/15/1512/18/15

    Fingerprint

    Dynamic Networks
    Incentives
    Nonlinear Dynamics
    Reward
    Incentive Mechanism
    Stability Index
    Game Design
    Private Information
    Non-cooperative Game
    Bidding
    Disclosure
    Local Stability
    Welfare
    Operator
    Maximise
    Perturbation
    Controller
    Controllers
    Design
    Optimal design

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Control and Systems Engineering
    • Modeling and Simulation
    • Control and Optimization

    Cite this

    Kim, H., & Zhu, M. (2015). Optimal incentive design for distributed stabilizing control of nonlinear dynamic networks. In 54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015 (pp. 2289-2294). [7402548] (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control; Vol. 54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2015.7402548
    Kim, Hunmin ; Zhu, Minghui. / Optimal incentive design for distributed stabilizing control of nonlinear dynamic networks. 54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. pp. 2289-2294 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control).
    @inproceedings{6da4ee94977d46d4829e66aa4f7abc98,
    title = "Optimal incentive design for distributed stabilizing control of nonlinear dynamic networks",
    abstract = "In many dynamic networks, control authorities seek for heterogeneous and even partially conflicting subobjectives. The misaligned interests threaten reliability of dynamic networks and degrade their operating performance. In this paper, we focus on design and analysis of mechanisms where a system operator provides a reward to incentivize control authorities to implement distributed stabilizing controllers. The proposed mechanisms are based on a bidding scheme where the bid of each control authority is represented by a newly derived local stability index. The mechanism induces a non-cooperative game between local control authorities while minimizing disclosures of their private information. By perturbing the game, we design an optimal incentive mechanism where the system operator can ensure network-wide stability and simultaneously maximize a social welfare while minimizing the reward size and perturbations.",
    author = "Hunmin Kim and Minghui Zhu",
    year = "2015",
    month = "2",
    day = "8",
    doi = "10.1109/CDC.2015.7402548",
    language = "English (US)",
    series = "Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control",
    publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",
    pages = "2289--2294",
    booktitle = "54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015",
    address = "United States",

    }

    Kim, H & Zhu, M 2015, Optimal incentive design for distributed stabilizing control of nonlinear dynamic networks. in 54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015., 7402548, Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, vol. 54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 2289-2294, 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2015, Osaka, Japan, 12/15/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2015.7402548

    Optimal incentive design for distributed stabilizing control of nonlinear dynamic networks. / Kim, Hunmin; Zhu, Minghui.

    54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. p. 2289-2294 7402548 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control; Vol. 54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015).

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    TY - GEN

    T1 - Optimal incentive design for distributed stabilizing control of nonlinear dynamic networks

    AU - Kim, Hunmin

    AU - Zhu, Minghui

    PY - 2015/2/8

    Y1 - 2015/2/8

    N2 - In many dynamic networks, control authorities seek for heterogeneous and even partially conflicting subobjectives. The misaligned interests threaten reliability of dynamic networks and degrade their operating performance. In this paper, we focus on design and analysis of mechanisms where a system operator provides a reward to incentivize control authorities to implement distributed stabilizing controllers. The proposed mechanisms are based on a bidding scheme where the bid of each control authority is represented by a newly derived local stability index. The mechanism induces a non-cooperative game between local control authorities while minimizing disclosures of their private information. By perturbing the game, we design an optimal incentive mechanism where the system operator can ensure network-wide stability and simultaneously maximize a social welfare while minimizing the reward size and perturbations.

    AB - In many dynamic networks, control authorities seek for heterogeneous and even partially conflicting subobjectives. The misaligned interests threaten reliability of dynamic networks and degrade their operating performance. In this paper, we focus on design and analysis of mechanisms where a system operator provides a reward to incentivize control authorities to implement distributed stabilizing controllers. The proposed mechanisms are based on a bidding scheme where the bid of each control authority is represented by a newly derived local stability index. The mechanism induces a non-cooperative game between local control authorities while minimizing disclosures of their private information. By perturbing the game, we design an optimal incentive mechanism where the system operator can ensure network-wide stability and simultaneously maximize a social welfare while minimizing the reward size and perturbations.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84962034550&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84962034550&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1109/CDC.2015.7402548

    DO - 10.1109/CDC.2015.7402548

    M3 - Conference contribution

    AN - SCOPUS:84962034550

    T3 - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control

    SP - 2289

    EP - 2294

    BT - 54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015

    PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

    ER -

    Kim H, Zhu M. Optimal incentive design for distributed stabilizing control of nonlinear dynamic networks. In 54rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2015. p. 2289-2294. 7402548. (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control). https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2015.7402548