Organized interests and the decision of whom to lobby in congress

Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

136 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a departure from previous research, we focus on the dyadic relationship between lobbyists and committee members in the House of Representatives in order to test hypotheses about what factors shape the decisions of individual groups to lobby individual committee members. Our primary assumption is that organized interests seek to expand their supportive coalitions and affect the content and fate of bills referred to committees. In order to accomplish these goals, they give highest priority to lobbying their legislative allies in committee; allies may lobby other members of Congress on a group's behalf and shape legislation to conform with a group's preferences. But organizations with access to a strong resource base can move beyond their allies and work directly to expand support among undecided committee members and legislative opponents. Our empirical analysis provides evidence to support our expectations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)775-790
Number of pages16
JournalAmerican Political Science Review
Volume92
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1998

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lobby
allies
Group
research focus
bill
coalition
legislation
resources
evidence

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

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Organized interests and the decision of whom to lobby in congress. / Hojnacki, Marie; Kimball, David C.

In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 4, 01.01.1998, p. 775-790.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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