Partisan politics, interest rates and the stock market: Evidence from American and British returns in the twentieth century

Bumba Mukherjee, David Leblang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine the relationship between government partisanship, interest rates and the mean and volatility of stock prices in the United States and United Kingdom. We suggest that traders in the stock market rationally expect higher (lower) post-electoral interest rates during the incumbency of the left-wing (right-wing) party - Democrats and Labor (Republican and Conservative) - and in election years when they expect the left-wing (right-wing) party to win elections. We hypothesize that expectations of higher (lower) interest rates decrease (increase) the mean and volatility of stock prices during the actual incumbency or even anticipation of a left-wing (right-wing) party holding the office of the chief executive. Results from empirical models estimated on data from U.S. and U.K. markets over most of the twentieth century statistically support our claims.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)135-167
Number of pages33
JournalEconomics and Politics
Volume19
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2007

Fingerprint

Interest rates
Stock market
Partisan politics
20th century
Incumbency
Elections
Stock prices
Traders
Anticipation
Labor
Chief executives
Empirical model
Partisanship
Government

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Partisan politics, interest rates and the stock market : Evidence from American and British returns in the twentieth century. / Mukherjee, Bumba; Leblang, David.

In: Economics and Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, 01.07.2007, p. 135-167.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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