Partisan Portfolio Allocation in African Democracies

Margaret H. Ariotti, Sona Nadenichek Golder

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

What determines partisan portfolio allocation in African democracies? Despite the vast literature on government formation in Europe and Latin America, there have been no studies of partisan portfolio allocation in Africa. Although coalition governments are increasingly common in Africa, most studies focus on national leaders, and, thus, we know little about how ministerial posts are divided among cabinet parties. Using an original dataset of coalition governments in Africa from 1990 to 2014, we show that existing theories of partisan portfolio allocation can be successfully applied to African democracies. We find that African parties receive ministerial portfolios in rough proportion to their size, that formateur parties in Africa receive more ministerial portfolios than their European counterparts, and that the “formateur bonus” is greater in Africa’s presidential democracies than in its parliamentary ones. Our analyses suggest that scholars can benefit from paying more attention to both coalition governments and legislatures in their analyses of African politics.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)341-379
Number of pages39
JournalComparative Political Studies
Volume51
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2018

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democracy
coalition
Latin America
leader
politics

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

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Partisan Portfolio Allocation in African Democracies. / Ariotti, Margaret H.; Golder, Sona Nadenichek.

In: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 51, No. 3, 01.03.2018, p. 341-379.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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