Perfect equilibria of a model of n-person noncooperative bargaining

Vijay Krishna, Roberto Serrano

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the n-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the "continuation probability," ρ{variant}. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (a) small values of ρ{variant} and (b) large values of ρ{variant}. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of ρ{variant} is provided.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)259-272
Number of pages14
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume24
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 1995

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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