Pillage and property

J. S. Jordan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

37 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper introduces a class of coalitional games, called pillage games, as a model of Hobbesian anarchy. Any coalition can pillage, costlessly and with certainty, any less powerful coalition. Power is endogenous, so a pillage game does not have a characteristic function, but pillage provides a domination concept that defines a stable set, which represents an endogenous balance of power. Every stable set contains only finitely many allocations, and can be represented as a farsighted core. Additional results are obtained for particular games, including the game in which the power of each coalition is determined by its total wealth.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)26-44
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume131
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2006

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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