Policy agendas, party control, and PAC contributions in the American states

Justin H. Kirkland, Virginia Gray, David Lynn Lowery

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this research we hypothesize that aggregate PAC behavior is conditional in nature. PACs in a specific issue sector donate more to a certain political party's candidates the more that political party controls the legislature. However, the more active the legislature is on a specific set of issues the more people/groups/PACs are mobilized in response to the issue. Thus, a conditional relationship emerges where aggregate PAC donations to a political party are a function of party control, agenda activity, and an interaction of the two. We test this conditional theory using data from the Institute on Money in State Politics database on PAC donations to state legislative candidates divided into issue sectors. Our results provide support for our hypotheses that aggregate PAC donations to a political party's candidates are conditional on the level of agenda activity on the issues that concern the PACs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number2
JournalBusiness and Politics
Volume12
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 20 2010

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donation
candidacy
money
politics
Agenda
Political parties
interaction
Donation
Group
Legislatures

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Industrial relations
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Kirkland, Justin H. ; Gray, Virginia ; Lowery, David Lynn. / Policy agendas, party control, and PAC contributions in the American states. In: Business and Politics. 2010 ; Vol. 12, No. 4.
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Policy agendas, party control, and PAC contributions in the American states. / Kirkland, Justin H.; Gray, Virginia; Lowery, David Lynn.

In: Business and Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2, 20.12.2010.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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