Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels

Aslan Askarov, Danfeng Zhang, Andrew C. Myers

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

92 Scopus citations

Abstract

We investigate techniques for general black-box mitigation of timing channels. The source of events is wrapped by a timing mitigator that delays output events so that they contain only a bounded amount of information. We introduce a general class of timing mitigators that can achieve any given bound on timing channel leakage, with a tradeoff in system performance. We show these mitigators compose well with other mechanisms for information flow control, and demonstrate they are effective against some known timing attacks.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCCS'10 - Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Pages297-307
Number of pages11
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 16 2010
Event17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS'10 - Chicago, IL, United States
Duration: Oct 4 2010Oct 8 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN (Print)1543-7221

Other

Other17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS'10
CountryUnited States
CityChicago, IL
Period10/4/1010/8/10

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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