TY - JOUR
T1 - Preferences for power
AU - Pikulina, Elena S.
AU - Tergiman, Chloe
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Nageeb Ali, Elena Asparouhova, Gary Bolton, Gary Charness, Emel Feliz-Ozbay, Zack Grossman, Yoram Halevy, Paul J. Healy, Holger Herz, Elena Katok, Tony Kwasnica, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Ryan Oprea, Erkut Ozbay, Carolin Pflueger, Doron Ravid, Ran Shorrer, Ron Siegel, Ennio Stacchetti, Severine Toussaert, Neslihan Uler, Emanuel Vespa, Marie-Claire Villeval, and Sevgi Yuksel for lively discussions and valuable feedback. We also benefited from comments from seminar participants at Bocconi University, The Sauder School of Business at UBC, Simon Fraser University, Pittsburgh University, The Technion (Haifa, Israel), GATE-LSE (Lyon, France), University of Zürich, University of Maryland, The Pennsylvania State University, The Naveen Jindal School of Business at UT Dallas, Chapman University, University of Utah, University of Toronto as well as participants at the following conferences: the Southwest Experimental and Behavioral Economics Workshop at UCSB, the Bay Area Behavioral and Experimental Economics Workshop at Santa Clara University, ESA San Diego, the TIBER Conference, the CESS 15th Anniversary Conference at NYU, SAET (Ischia, Italy). Pikulina and Tergiman are also very grateful for generous funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
Funding Information:
We thank Nageeb Ali, Elena Asparouhova, Gary Bolton, Gary Charness, Emel Feliz-Ozbay, Zack Grossman, Yoram Halevy, Paul J. Healy, Holger Herz, Elena Katok, Tony Kwasnica, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Ryan Oprea, Erkut Ozbay, Carolin Pflueger, Doron Ravid, Ran Shorrer, Ron Siegel, Ennio Stacchetti, Severine Toussaert, Neslihan Uler, Emanuel Vespa, Marie-Claire Villeval, and Sevgi Yuksel for lively discussions and valuable feedback. We also benefited from comments from seminar participants at Bocconi University, The Sauder School of Business at UBC, Simon Fraser University, Pittsburgh University, The Technion (Haifa, Israel), GATE-LSE (Lyon, France), University of Zürich, University of Maryland, The Pennsylvania State University, The Naveen Jindal School of Business at UT Dallas, Chapman University, University of Utah, University of Toronto as well as participants at the following conferences: the Southwest Experimental and Behavioral Economics Workshop at UCSB, the Bay Area Behavioral and Experimental Economics Workshop at Santa Clara University, ESA San Diego, the TIBER Conference, the CESS 15th Anniversary Conference at NYU, SAET (Ischia, Italy). Pikulina and Tergiman are also very grateful for generous funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2020/5
Y1 - 2020/5
N2 - Power—the ability to determine the outcomes of others—usually comes with various benefits: higher compensation, public recognition, etc. We develop a new game, the Power Game, to demonstrate that a substantial fraction of individuals enjoy the intrinsic value of power: they accept lower payoffs in exchange for power over others, without any benefits to themselves. These preferences exist independently of other components of decision rights, cannot be explained by social preferences and are not driven by mistakes, confusion or signaling intentions. We further show that valuation of power (i) is higher when individuals directly determine outcomes of others; (ii) depends on how much discretion one has over those outcomes; and (iii) is tied to relationships between individuals. We establish that ignoring preferences for power may have large welfare implications and, consequently, should be included in the study of political systems and labor contracts.
AB - Power—the ability to determine the outcomes of others—usually comes with various benefits: higher compensation, public recognition, etc. We develop a new game, the Power Game, to demonstrate that a substantial fraction of individuals enjoy the intrinsic value of power: they accept lower payoffs in exchange for power over others, without any benefits to themselves. These preferences exist independently of other components of decision rights, cannot be explained by social preferences and are not driven by mistakes, confusion or signaling intentions. We further show that valuation of power (i) is higher when individuals directly determine outcomes of others; (ii) depends on how much discretion one has over those outcomes; and (iii) is tied to relationships between individuals. We establish that ignoring preferences for power may have large welfare implications and, consequently, should be included in the study of political systems and labor contracts.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85083296971&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104173
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104173
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85083296971
SN - 0047-2727
VL - 185
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
M1 - 104173
ER -