TY - JOUR
T1 - Profiting from connections
T2 - Do politicians receive stock tips from brokerage houses?
AU - Stephan, Andrew P.
AU - Walther, Beverly R.
AU - Wellman, Laura A.
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank an anonymous referee, Brian Cadman, Andrew Call, Dane Christensen, Atif Ellahie, Michelle Hanlon (editor), Robert Holthausen, Michael Kirschenheiter (discussant), Thomas Omer, Doug Rayburn, Jordan Schoenfeld, and participants at the 2016 BYU Accounting Research Symposium, 2017 FARS Midyear Meeting, and 2018 University of Illinois at Chicago Accounting Research Conference for useful comments and suggestions. We appreciate the financial support from the Leeds School of Business at the University of Colorado , the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University , and the Smeal College of Business at Pennsylvania State University . Analyst recommendations are from Zacks Investment Research. Errors or omissions are our responsibility.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2021/8
Y1 - 2021/8
N2 - This study investigates whether brokerage houses appear to provide stock tips to politicians. Our results indicate that trades by politicians who are politically connected to the brokerage house where the trade is executed are more profitable. Our estimates suggest that these connected trades earn an incremental 0.3% over a five-day window relative to the politician's average profitability. Given the average number of trades our sample politicians execute in a year, the 0.3% return per trade translates to an incremental $3,411 in trading profits each year. We provide additional support by investigating the frequency and differential profitability of politicians' trades immediately before the brokerage house issues a revised recommendation, as well as during a period when Goldman, Sachs & Co. was sanctioned for providing stock tips to high priority clients. Additional tests suggest that brokerages may provide stock tips to politicians in exchange for favorable legislative outcomes or political information.
AB - This study investigates whether brokerage houses appear to provide stock tips to politicians. Our results indicate that trades by politicians who are politically connected to the brokerage house where the trade is executed are more profitable. Our estimates suggest that these connected trades earn an incremental 0.3% over a five-day window relative to the politician's average profitability. Given the average number of trades our sample politicians execute in a year, the 0.3% return per trade translates to an incremental $3,411 in trading profits each year. We provide additional support by investigating the frequency and differential profitability of politicians' trades immediately before the brokerage house issues a revised recommendation, as well as during a period when Goldman, Sachs & Co. was sanctioned for providing stock tips to high priority clients. Additional tests suggest that brokerages may provide stock tips to politicians in exchange for favorable legislative outcomes or political information.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101401
DO - 10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101401
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85104092984
VL - 72
JO - Journal of Accounting and Economics
JF - Journal of Accounting and Economics
SN - 0165-4101
IS - 1
M1 - 101401
ER -