Public goods, private partnerships, and political institutions

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become an essential vehicle of infrastructure development worldwide. Theoretical arguments primarily focus on build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreements as a canonical form of PPP, though they rarely discuss the political underpinnings of governments' decisions to enter such agreements. How does a government's longevity, stability, and its capacity to raise revenue make BOTs more attractive than other types of partnerships? Extending recent theoretical advances through concepts of control rights and veto players and statistically analyzing a database of more than 4,300 PPP agreements of new construction of infrastructure in 83 developing economies between 1990 and 2014, I provide the first large-scale quantitative evidence of the influence of political institutions on government choices to adopt BOTs. I find that BOTs are less attractive as the tenure of the longest-serving veto player increases, when veto players are more frequently replaced, and when governments can generate more tax revenue, but more likely when that revenue is above a country's historic average. My findings contribute to literatures on distributive public policy, hybrid governance, complex project management, and to the policy debate about the role of PPPs in economic development.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)67-83
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Volume29
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2 2019

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public private partnership
political institution
revenue
infrastructure development
tax revenue
project management
public policy
governance
infrastructure
economy
Political institutions
Public-private partnerships
Government
evidence
economics
veto player
Veto players
Revenue

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration
  • Marketing

Cite this

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Public goods, private partnerships, and political institutions. / Bertelli, Anthony M.

In: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 29, No. 1, 02.01.2019, p. 67-83.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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