Public Pension Funds and Assumed Rates of Return

An Empirical Examination of Public Sector Defined Benefit Pension Plans

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This research adds to an existing body of research that suggests that the adoption of investment return assumptions associated with public sector defined benefit (DB) pension plans may partly be explained by political opportunism. This research adds to this literature by examining how oversight and monitoring efforts and investment boards' relative independence from the political process influence adopted investment return assumptions. Based on a multivariate regression analysis of data on 88 state DB pension plans in the United States, the results of this study suggest that adopted investment return assumptions are partly determined by investment boards' affiliation with the political process. The results also indicate that the adopted assumptions are influenced by asset allocations and the fiscal condition of pension plans. The findings of the study are important in part because they draw attention to possible linkages between the quality of financial information that is reported about the financial condition of public pension funds and their surrounding governance structure. Reliable information about the actual size of unfunded pension liabilities is critical in political environments, where there tend to be a bias toward shifting pension obligations to future constituents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)92-111
Number of pages20
JournalAmerican Review of Public Administration
Volume44
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014

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pension fund
pension
public sector
examination
opportunism
multivariate analysis
liability
obligation
regression analysis
assets
Public pensions
Pension funds
Rate of return
Public sector
Defined benefit pension plans
governance
monitoring
trend

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration
  • Marketing

Cite this

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