Reconsidering the counter-mobilization hypothesis

Health policy lobbying in the American states

David Lynn Lowery, Virginia Gray, Jennifer Wolak, Erik Godwin, Whitt Kilburn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Despite its widespread use since the concept was introduced by David Truman (1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf), counter-mobilization by organized interests has remained theoretically ambiguous and rarely studied empirically. We more fully develop the concept of short-term counter-mobilization, distinguish it from long-term counter-mobilization, specify the conditions under which we might observe short-term counter-mobilization, and test the resulting hypotheses with data on health care lobby registrations in the American states during the late 1990s. We find little evidence of short-term counter-mobilization among health interest organizations, which leads us to more fully consider several null hypotheses about the limits of strategic behavior on the part of organized interests.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)99-132
Number of pages34
JournalPolitical Behavior
Volume27
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2005

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health policy
mobilization
lobby
health care
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evidence

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Lowery, David Lynn ; Gray, Virginia ; Wolak, Jennifer ; Godwin, Erik ; Kilburn, Whitt. / Reconsidering the counter-mobilization hypothesis : Health policy lobbying in the American states. In: Political Behavior. 2005 ; Vol. 27, No. 2. pp. 99-132.
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Reconsidering the counter-mobilization hypothesis : Health policy lobbying in the American states. / Lowery, David Lynn; Gray, Virginia; Wolak, Jennifer; Godwin, Erik; Kilburn, Whitt.

In: Political Behavior, Vol. 27, No. 2, 01.06.2005, p. 99-132.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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