Regime types and terrorism

Khusrav Gaibulloev, James A. Piazza, Todd Sandler

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

43 Scopus citations

Abstract

Regime type has opposing effects on terrorism. If a regime constrains the executive branch, then terrorism may be more prevalent. If, however, a regime allows all viewpoints to be represented, then grievances may be held in check, resulting in less terrorism. Regimes that value constituents' lives and property will also act to limit attacks. We formulate a game-theoretic model, containing a terrorist group and targeted government, that captures these opposing forces and supports a nonlinear relationship between regime type and terrorism. This model indicates how diverse samples in the literature can result in different relationships between regime type and terrorism. Seldom does it support the positive relationship that is prevalent in the terrorism literature. We apply a large variety of empirical techniques to show that regime type has a robust inverted U-shaped impact on various terrorism measures. Foreign policy variables (e.g., alliance with the United States) are not a robust influence on terrorism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)491-522
Number of pages32
JournalInternational Organization
Volume71
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Law

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Regime types and terrorism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this