Regulation and administered contracts revisited: Lessons from transaction-cost economics for public utility regulation

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Abstract

This article reexamines the administered contracts approach to regulation in light of recent empirical research that establishes the importance of transaction-costs in the organizational choice and design decisions. After reviewing the fundamentals of transaction cost reasoning and the franchise bidding-versus-regulation debate, the study surveys the empirical literature on franchise bidding, contracting, and vertical integration. The implications of transaction-cost theories for current policies toward pubic utility regulation and deregulation are also addressed.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)5-39
Number of pages35
JournalJournal of Regulatory Economics
Volume9
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 1996

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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