Repeated coordination with private learning

Pathikrit Basu, Kalyan Chatterjee, Tetsuya Hoshino, Omer Tamuz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from private signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that there exist stable equilibria in which players can overcome unfavorable signal realizations and eventually coordinate on the correct action, for any discount factor. For high discount factors, we show that in addition players can also achieve efficient payoffs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number105106
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume190
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2020

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Repeated coordination with private learning'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this