Resistance to the regulation of common water resources in rural Tunisia

Xiaoying Liu, Mare Sarr, Timothy Swanson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine the effect of the introduction of uniform water charging for aquifer management and provide evidence using a survey-based choice experiment of agricultural water users in rural Tunisia. Theoretically, we show that the implementation of the proposed second-best regulation would result both in efficiency gains and in distributional effects in favor of small landholders. Empirically, we find that resistance to the introduction of an effective water-charging regime is greatest among the largest landholders. Resistance to the regulation of common resources may be rooted in the manner in which heterogeneity might determine the distributional impact of different management regimes.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)435-459
Number of pages25
JournalLand Economics
Volume91
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2015

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water resource
water
aquifer
resource
regulation
Tunisia
Water
Water resources
experiment
effect
Distributional impacts
Efficiency gains
Resources
Choice experiment
Distributional effects

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Environmental Science (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Liu, Xiaoying ; Sarr, Mare ; Swanson, Timothy. / Resistance to the regulation of common water resources in rural Tunisia. In: Land Economics. 2015 ; Vol. 91, No. 3. pp. 435-459.
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Resistance to the regulation of common water resources in rural Tunisia. / Liu, Xiaoying; Sarr, Mare; Swanson, Timothy.

In: Land Economics, Vol. 91, No. 3, 01.01.2015, p. 435-459.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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