RETAKING IN HIGH STAKES EXAMS: IS LESS MORE?

Kala Krishna, Sergey Lychagin, Veronica Frisancho

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Placement, both in university and in the civil service, according to performance in competitive exams is the norm in much of the world. Repeat taking of such exams is common despite the private and social costs it imposes. We develop and estimate a structural model of exam retaking using data from Turkey's university placement exam. Limiting retaking results in all agents gaining ex ante and most gaining ex post. This result comes from a general equilibrium effect: Retakers crowd the market and impose negative spillovers on others by raising acceptance cutoffs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)449-477
Number of pages29
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume59
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2018

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Placement
Social costs
Spillover
Turkey
Structural model
Acceptance
Civil service
General equilibrium

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Krishna, Kala ; Lychagin, Sergey ; Frisancho, Veronica. / RETAKING IN HIGH STAKES EXAMS : IS LESS MORE?. In: International Economic Review. 2018 ; Vol. 59, No. 2. pp. 449-477.
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RETAKING IN HIGH STAKES EXAMS : IS LESS MORE? / Krishna, Kala; Lychagin, Sergey; Frisancho, Veronica.

In: International Economic Review, Vol. 59, No. 2, 01.05.2018, p. 449-477.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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