Rivals' search for buried treasure: Competition and duplication in R&D

Kalyan Chatterjee, Robert Evans

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze an R&D race in which, in each period, two firms each choose which of two research projects to invest in. Each observes the other's past choices and so strategic search is possible. Equilibrium is efficient if the projects differ only in their probability of being the "right" project. If they differ in other dimensions (e.g., cost), then there may be too much or too little duplication relative to the social optimum.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)160-183
Number of pages24
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Volume35
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2004

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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