We consider the round complexity of multi-party computation in the presence of a static adversary who controls a majority of the parties. Here, n players wish to securely compute some functionality and up to n - 1 of these players may be arbitrarily malicious. Previous protocols for this setting (when a broadcast channel is available) require O(n) rounds. We present two protocols with improved round complexity: The first assumes only the existence of trapdoor permutations and dense cryptosystems, and achieves round complexity O(log n) based on a proof scheduling technique of Chor and Rabin ; the second requires a stronger hardness assumption (along with the non-black-box techniques of Barak ) and achieves O(1) round complexity.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||18|
|Journal||Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)|
|State||Published - Dec 1 2003|
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Computer Science(all)