Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners

Kalyan Chatterjee, Bhaskar Dutta

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

20 Scopus citations


This paper analyzes the effect of competition for bargaining partners on the prices that prevail in thin markets, as well as how the matches are simultaneously determined. Three trading processes or bargaining procedures are described. In all the variants that we consider, except for one case of public offers, either there is no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium or such equilibria exhibit delay in reaching agreement.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D43.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)119-145
Number of pages27
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - May 1 1998

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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