Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners

Kalyan Chatterjee, Bhaskar Dutta

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of competition for bargaining partners on the prices that prevail in thin markets. as well as how the matches are simultaneously determined. Three trading processes or bargaining procedures are described. In all the variants that we consider, except for one case of public offers, either there is no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium or such equilibria exhibit delay in reaching agreement. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationBargaining in the Shadow of the Market
Subtitle of host publicationSelected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining
PublisherWorld Scientific Publishing Co.
Pages51-78
Number of pages28
ISBN (Electronic)9789814447577
ISBN (Print)9814447560, 9789814447560
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Mathematics(all)

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