Russia's vanishing deterrent

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Even in the post-Cold War world, the stability of nuclear deterrence as between not-unfriendly US and Russian governments remains significant. Nuclear stability implies mutual confidence that the minimum conditions of rational deterrence models are fulfilled with high confidence. As US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals are gradually reduced in conformity with the Moscow Treaty to levels far below current deployments, the qualities of forces and the performances of their command and control systems matter as much as do the exact quantities of weapons held by the two sides. Data analysis shows that both the US and Russia can expect to maintain a minimum counter-city deterrent even at levels below the once proposed START III or agreed Moscow treaty limits, but defense deployments add uncertainty to projections and might compromise second strike retaliation under some conditions of launch readiness or warning.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-24
Number of pages24
JournalInternational Journal of Phytoremediation
Volume15
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2002

Fingerprint

treaties
International cooperation
Russia
Command and control systems
Arsenals
post-Cold War
weapon
control system
data analysis
uncertainty
deterrent
deterrence
treaty
Uncertainty
defence
city

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Environmental Chemistry
  • Pollution
  • Plant Science

Cite this

@article{c17b716c92f94730898d0bbf12e8566a,
title = "Russia's vanishing deterrent",
abstract = "Even in the post-Cold War world, the stability of nuclear deterrence as between not-unfriendly US and Russian governments remains significant. Nuclear stability implies mutual confidence that the minimum conditions of rational deterrence models are fulfilled with high confidence. As US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals are gradually reduced in conformity with the Moscow Treaty to levels far below current deployments, the qualities of forces and the performances of their command and control systems matter as much as do the exact quantities of weapons held by the two sides. Data analysis shows that both the US and Russia can expect to maintain a minimum counter-city deterrent even at levels below the once proposed START III or agreed Moscow treaty limits, but defense deployments add uncertainty to projections and might compromise second strike retaliation under some conditions of launch readiness or warning.",
author = "Stephen Cimbala",
year = "2002",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1080/13518040208430526",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "15",
pages = "1--24",
journal = "International Journal of Phytoremediation",
issn = "1522-6514",
publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",
number = "3",

}

Russia's vanishing deterrent. / Cimbala, Stephen.

In: International Journal of Phytoremediation, Vol. 15, No. 3, 01.01.2002, p. 1-24.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Russia's vanishing deterrent

AU - Cimbala, Stephen

PY - 2002/1/1

Y1 - 2002/1/1

N2 - Even in the post-Cold War world, the stability of nuclear deterrence as between not-unfriendly US and Russian governments remains significant. Nuclear stability implies mutual confidence that the minimum conditions of rational deterrence models are fulfilled with high confidence. As US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals are gradually reduced in conformity with the Moscow Treaty to levels far below current deployments, the qualities of forces and the performances of their command and control systems matter as much as do the exact quantities of weapons held by the two sides. Data analysis shows that both the US and Russia can expect to maintain a minimum counter-city deterrent even at levels below the once proposed START III or agreed Moscow treaty limits, but defense deployments add uncertainty to projections and might compromise second strike retaliation under some conditions of launch readiness or warning.

AB - Even in the post-Cold War world, the stability of nuclear deterrence as between not-unfriendly US and Russian governments remains significant. Nuclear stability implies mutual confidence that the minimum conditions of rational deterrence models are fulfilled with high confidence. As US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals are gradually reduced in conformity with the Moscow Treaty to levels far below current deployments, the qualities of forces and the performances of their command and control systems matter as much as do the exact quantities of weapons held by the two sides. Data analysis shows that both the US and Russia can expect to maintain a minimum counter-city deterrent even at levels below the once proposed START III or agreed Moscow treaty limits, but defense deployments add uncertainty to projections and might compromise second strike retaliation under some conditions of launch readiness or warning.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064797150&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85064797150&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/13518040208430526

DO - 10.1080/13518040208430526

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85064797150

VL - 15

SP - 1

EP - 24

JO - International Journal of Phytoremediation

JF - International Journal of Phytoremediation

SN - 1522-6514

IS - 3

ER -