Second-Order Preferences and Instrumental Rationality

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Abstract

A second-order preference is a preference over preferences. This paper addresses the role that second-order preferences play in a theory of instrumental rationality. I argue that second-order preferences have no role to play in the prescription or evaluation of actions aimed at ordinary ends. Instead, second-order preferences are relevant to prescribing or evaluating actions only insofar as those actions have a role in changing or maintaining first-order preferences. I establish these claims by examining and rejecting the view that second-order preferences trump first-order preferences. I also examine and reject the view that second-order preferences give additional normative force to an agent's preferred first-order preferences. I conclude by arguing that second-order preferences should be integrated into an agent's object-level preference ordering, and by explaining how best to make sense of this integration.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)367-385
Number of pages19
JournalActa Analytica
Volume26
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

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