Securing ARP from the ground up

Jing Dave Tian, Kevin R.B. Butler, Patrick Drew McDaniel, Padma Krishnaswamy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

The basis for all IPv4 network communication is the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), which maps an IP address to a device's Media Access Control (MAC) identifier. ARP has long been recognized as vulnerable to spoofing and other attacks, and past proposals to secure the protocol have often involved modifying the basic protocol. This paper introduces arpsec, a secure ARP/RARP pro- tocol suite which a) does not require protocol modification, b) enables continual verification of the identity of the tar- get (respondent) machine by introducing an address binding repository derived using a formal logic that bases additions to a host's ARP cache on a set of operational rules and prop- erties, c) utilizes the TPM, a commodity component now present in the vast majority of modern computers, to aug- ment the logic-prover-derived assurance when needed, with TPM-facilitated attestations of system state achieved at vi- ably low processing cost. Using commodity TPMs as our attestation base, we show that arpsec incurs an overhead ranging from 7% to 15:4% over the standard Linux ARP implementation and provides a first step towards a formally secure and trustworthy networking stack.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCODASPY 2015 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages305-312
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781450331913
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2 2015
Event5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, CODASPY 2015 - San Antonio, United States
Duration: Mar 2 2015Mar 4 2015

Publication series

NameCODASPY 2015 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy

Other

Other5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, CODASPY 2015
CountryUnited States
CitySan Antonio
Period3/2/153/4/15

Fingerprint

Network protocols
Formal logic
Medium access control
Telecommunication networks
Processing
Costs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Information Systems
  • Software
  • Computer Science Applications

Cite this

Tian, J. D., Butler, K. R. B., McDaniel, P. D., & Krishnaswamy, P. (2015). Securing ARP from the ground up. In CODASPY 2015 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (pp. 305-312). (CODASPY 2015 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy). Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699123
Tian, Jing Dave ; Butler, Kevin R.B. ; McDaniel, Patrick Drew ; Krishnaswamy, Padma. / Securing ARP from the ground up. CODASPY 2015 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, 2015. pp. 305-312 (CODASPY 2015 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy).
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Tian, JD, Butler, KRB, McDaniel, PD & Krishnaswamy, P 2015, Securing ARP from the ground up. in CODASPY 2015 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy. CODASPY 2015 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, pp. 305-312, 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, CODASPY 2015, San Antonio, United States, 3/2/15. https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699123

Securing ARP from the ground up. / Tian, Jing Dave; Butler, Kevin R.B.; McDaniel, Patrick Drew; Krishnaswamy, Padma.

CODASPY 2015 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, 2015. p. 305-312 (CODASPY 2015 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Tian JD, Butler KRB, McDaniel PD, Krishnaswamy P. Securing ARP from the ground up. In CODASPY 2015 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. 2015. p. 305-312. (CODASPY 2015 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy). https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699123