Security games with market insurance

Benjamin Johnson, Rainer Böhme, Jens Grossklags

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

30 Scopus citations

Abstract

Security games are characterized by multiple players who strategically adjust their defenses against an abstract attacker, represented by realizations of nature. The defense strategies include both actions where security generates positive externalities and actions that do not. When the players are assumed to be risk averse, market insurance enters as a third strategic option. We formulate a one-shot security game with market insurance, characterize its pure equilibria, and describe how the equilibria compare to established results. Simplifying assumptions include homogeneous players, fair insurance premiums, and complete information except for realizations of nature. The results add more realism to the interpretation of analytical models of security games and might inform policy makers on adjusting incentives to improve network security and foster the development of a market for cyber-insurance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - Second International Conference, GameSec 2011, Proceedings
Pages117-130
Number of pages14
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Event2nd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011 - College Park, MD, United States
Duration: Nov 14 2011Nov 15 2011

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7037 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other2nd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011
CountryUnited States
CityCollege Park, MD
Period11/14/1111/15/11

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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