Self-Interest and the Design of Rules

Manvir Singh, Richard Wrangham, Luke Glowacki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Rules regulating social behavior raise challenging questions about cultural evolution in part because they frequently confer group-level benefits. Current multilevel selection theories contend that between-group processes interact with within-group processes to produce norms and institutions, but within-group processes have remained underspecified, leading to a recent emphasis on cultural group selection as the primary driver of cultural design. Here we present the self-interested enforcement (SIE) hypothesis, which proposes that the design of rules importantly reflects the relative enforcement capacities of competing parties. We show that, in addition to explaining patterns in cultural change and stability, SIE can account for the emergence of much group-functional culture. We outline how this process can stifle or accelerate cultural group selection, depending on various social conditions. Self-interested enforcement has important bearings on the emergence, stability, and change of rules.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)457-480
Number of pages24
JournalHuman Nature
Volume28
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2017

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group process
group selection
Group
social behavior
cultural change
functional group
enforcement
Enforcement
social factors
Group Processes
driver
Group Selection
Cultural Groups

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
  • Anthropology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Singh, Manvir ; Wrangham, Richard ; Glowacki, Luke. / Self-Interest and the Design of Rules. In: Human Nature. 2017 ; Vol. 28, No. 4. pp. 457-480.
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Self-Interest and the Design of Rules. / Singh, Manvir; Wrangham, Richard; Glowacki, Luke.

In: Human Nature, Vol. 28, No. 4, 01.12.2017, p. 457-480.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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