Servicers and Mortgage-Backed Securities Default: Theory and Evidence

Brent William Ambrose, Anthony B. Sanders, Abdullah Yavas

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study conflicting incentives of the master and special servicers in handling troubled loans in a Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities deal and how the frictions between the interests of the two servicers might be diminished if the master and special servicing rights are held by the same firm. We show that concentrating both servicing rights in one firm reduces the likelihood that a defaulted loan terminates in foreclosure.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)462-489
Number of pages28
JournalReal Estate Economics
Volume44
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2016

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Loans
Mortgage-backed securities
Servicing
Incentives
Friction
Foreclosure

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Ambrose, Brent William ; Sanders, Anthony B. ; Yavas, Abdullah. / Servicers and Mortgage-Backed Securities Default : Theory and Evidence. In: Real Estate Economics. 2016 ; Vol. 44, No. 2. pp. 462-489.
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Servicers and Mortgage-Backed Securities Default : Theory and Evidence. / Ambrose, Brent William; Sanders, Anthony B.; Yavas, Abdullah.

In: Real Estate Economics, Vol. 44, No. 2, 01.06.2016, p. 462-489.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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