Spoils division rules shape aggression between natural groups

Gönül Doǧan, Luke Glowacki, Hannes Rusch

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Violent intergroup conflicts cause widespread harm; yet, throughout human history, destructive hostilities occur time and time again 1,2 . Benefits that are obtainable by victorious parties include territorial expansion, deterrence and ascendency in between-group resource competition 3-6 . Many of these are non-excludable goods that are available to all group members, whereas participation entails substantial individual risks and costs. Thus, a collective action problem emerges, raising the question why individuals participate in such campaigns at all 7-9 . Distinguishing offensive and defensive intergroup aggression provides a partial answer: defensive aggression is adaptive under many circumstances 10-14 . However, participation in offensive aggression, such as raids or wars of conquest, still requires an explanation. Here, we focus on one condition that is hypothesized to facilitate the emergence of offensive intergroup aggression: asymmetric division of a conflict's spoils may motivate those profiting from such inequality to initiate between-group aggression, even if doing so jeopardizes their group's welfare 15-17 . We test this hypothesis by manipulating how benefits among victors are shared in a contest experiment among three Ethiopian societies whose relations are either peaceful or violent. Under equal sharing, between-group hostility increased contest contributions. By contrast, unequal sharing prompted offensive contribution strategies in privileged participants, whereas disadvantaged participants resorted to defensive strategies, both irrespective of group relations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)322-326
Number of pages5
JournalNature Human Behaviour
Volume2
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2018

Fingerprint

Aggression
Hostility
Vulnerable Populations
History
Costs and Cost Analysis
Conflict (Psychology)

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Social Psychology
  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
  • Behavioral Neuroscience

Cite this

Doǧan, Gönül ; Glowacki, Luke ; Rusch, Hannes. / Spoils division rules shape aggression between natural groups. In: Nature Human Behaviour. 2018 ; Vol. 2, No. 5. pp. 322-326.
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Spoils division rules shape aggression between natural groups. / Doǧan, Gönül; Glowacki, Luke; Rusch, Hannes.

In: Nature Human Behaviour, Vol. 2, No. 5, 01.05.2018, p. 322-326.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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