Stable Nash equilibria of ALOHA medium access games under symmetric, socially altruistic behavior

George Kesidis, Youngmi Jin, Amar Prakash Azad, Eitan Altman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider the effects of altruistic behavior on random medium access control (slotted ALOHA) for local area communication networks. For an idealized, synchronously iterative, two-player game with asymmetric player demands, we find a Lyapunov function governing the "better-response" Jacobi dynamics under purely altruistic behavior. Though the positions of the interior Nash equilibrium points do not change in the presence of altruistic behavior, the nature of their local asymptotic stability does. There is a region of partially altruistic behavior for which both interior Nash equilibrium points are locally asymptotically stable. Variations of these altruistic game frameworks are discussed considering power (instead of throughput) based costs and linear utility functions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010
Pages1071-1075
Number of pages5
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2010
Event2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010 - Atlanta, GA, United States
Duration: Dec 15 2010Dec 17 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0191-2216

Other

Other2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010
CountryUnited States
CityAtlanta, GA
Period12/15/1012/17/10

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

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