STACKELBERG GAMES ON A NETWORK WITH COURNOT‐NASH OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITORS

Tanfield C. Miller, Roger L. Tobin, Terry L. Friesz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

ABSTRACT. We formulate the spatial Stackelberg‐Nash‐Cournot competitive network equilibrium problem as a variational inequality constrained mathematical program. Our model differs from previous models of Stackelberg oligopolistic competition in that it employs explicit shipping decision variables and a general network topology. That is, the production and distribution decisions of the Stackelberg firm are determined simultaneously over a discrete network. We explore the existence of solutions to the proposed model, and we also numerically test a sensitivity analysis based algorithm. In particular, we illustrate how sensitivity analysis results can be used to generate the Cournot reaction necessary to solve the Stackelberg problem.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)435-454
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Regional Science
Volume31
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1991

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Development
  • Environmental Science (miscellaneous)

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