Strategies to achieve truthful spectrum auctions for cognitive radio networks based on mechanism design

Shabnam Sodagari, Alireza Attar, Sven G. Bilen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the design of a truthful auction for the case when a primary spectrum owner is willing to lease its idle spectral resources in sequential time periods. The secondary cognitive radios participate in the spectrum sharing auction by declaring to the primary their types, which consist of their arrival and departure time instances and valuations. The adapted methodology aims at reducing the collusion incentive among secondary users through the proper choice of the pricing policy and replacing second-price policy, such as in Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions, by the critical value auction. Furthermore, the proposed auction is dynamic and is performed on-line, in contrast to static off-line schemes such as VCG. Simulation results confirm the anti-cheating property of the proposed auction scheme.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum, DySPAN 2010
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 11 2010
Event2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum, DySPAN 2010 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: Apr 6 2010Apr 9 2010

Other

Other2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum, DySPAN 2010
CountrySingapore
CitySingapore
Period4/6/104/9/10

Fingerprint

Cognitive radio
Costs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Sodagari, S., Attar, A., & Bilen, S. G. (2010). Strategies to achieve truthful spectrum auctions for cognitive radio networks based on mechanism design. In 2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum, DySPAN 2010 [5457907] https://doi.org/10.1109/DYSPAN.2010.5457907
Sodagari, Shabnam ; Attar, Alireza ; Bilen, Sven G. / Strategies to achieve truthful spectrum auctions for cognitive radio networks based on mechanism design. 2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum, DySPAN 2010. 2010.
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Sodagari, S, Attar, A & Bilen, SG 2010, Strategies to achieve truthful spectrum auctions for cognitive radio networks based on mechanism design. in 2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum, DySPAN 2010., 5457907, 2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum, DySPAN 2010, Singapore, Singapore, 4/6/10. https://doi.org/10.1109/DYSPAN.2010.5457907

Strategies to achieve truthful spectrum auctions for cognitive radio networks based on mechanism design. / Sodagari, Shabnam; Attar, Alireza; Bilen, Sven G.

2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum, DySPAN 2010. 2010. 5457907.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Sodagari S, Attar A, Bilen SG. Strategies to achieve truthful spectrum auctions for cognitive radio networks based on mechanism design. In 2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum, DySPAN 2010. 2010. 5457907 https://doi.org/10.1109/DYSPAN.2010.5457907