Abstract
Vladimir Putin used a composite of ancient and modern methods of military persuasion in first destabilizing, and then annexing, Crimea in February and March of 2014. Putin's use of military persuasion through Russian and proxy forces enabled him to annex Crimea and to set the stage for further imposition of Russia's will on Ukraine's eastern provinces. Russia's determination to resist excessive Westernization by Ukraine, especially the possibility of Ukrainian membership in NATO, exceeded the willingness of the U.S. and its allies to reverse Putin's gains in Crimea.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 359-379 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Journal of Slavic Military Studies |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 2014 |
Fingerprint
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- History
- Political Science and International Relations
Cite this
}
Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21 February-18 March 2014. / Cimbala, Stephen J.
In: Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, 07.2014, p. 359-379.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21 February-18 March 2014
AU - Cimbala, Stephen J.
PY - 2014/7
Y1 - 2014/7
N2 - Vladimir Putin used a composite of ancient and modern methods of military persuasion in first destabilizing, and then annexing, Crimea in February and March of 2014. Putin's use of military persuasion through Russian and proxy forces enabled him to annex Crimea and to set the stage for further imposition of Russia's will on Ukraine's eastern provinces. Russia's determination to resist excessive Westernization by Ukraine, especially the possibility of Ukrainian membership in NATO, exceeded the willingness of the U.S. and its allies to reverse Putin's gains in Crimea.
AB - Vladimir Putin used a composite of ancient and modern methods of military persuasion in first destabilizing, and then annexing, Crimea in February and March of 2014. Putin's use of military persuasion through Russian and proxy forces enabled him to annex Crimea and to set the stage for further imposition of Russia's will on Ukraine's eastern provinces. Russia's determination to resist excessive Westernization by Ukraine, especially the possibility of Ukrainian membership in NATO, exceeded the willingness of the U.S. and its allies to reverse Putin's gains in Crimea.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84904692120&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84904692120&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/13518046.2014.932623
DO - 10.1080/13518046.2014.932623
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84904692120
VL - 27
SP - 359
EP - 379
JO - Journal of Slavic Military Studies
JF - Journal of Slavic Military Studies
SN - 1351-8046
IS - 3
ER -