Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21 February-18 March 2014

Stephen J. Cimbala

doi:10.1080/13518046.2014.932623

Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21 February-18 March 2014

Stephen J. Cimbala

Penn State Brandywine

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

Vladimir Putin used a composite of ancient and modern methods of military persuasion in first destabilizing, and then annexing, Crimea in February and March of 2014. Putin's use of military persuasion through Russian and proxy forces enabled him to annex Crimea and to set the stage for further imposition of Russia's will on Ukraine's eastern provinces. Russia's determination to resist excessive Westernization by Ukraine, especially the possibility of Ukrainian membership in NATO, exceeded the willingness of the U.S. and its allies to reverse Putin's gains in Crimea.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	359-379
Number of pages	21
Journal	Journal of Slavic Military Studies
Volume	27
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2014.932623
State	Published - Jul 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

History
Political Science and International Relations

Access to Document

10.1080/13518046.2014.932623

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21 February-18 March 2014'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this

Cimbala, S. J. (2014). Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21 February-18 March 2014. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 27(3), 359-379. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2014.932623

@article{ea1c8670a4194ca0957d7b87e367df90,

title = "Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21 February-18 March 2014",

abstract = "Vladimir Putin used a composite of ancient and modern methods of military persuasion in first destabilizing, and then annexing, Crimea in February and March of 2014. Putin's use of military persuasion through Russian and proxy forces enabled him to annex Crimea and to set the stage for further imposition of Russia's will on Ukraine's eastern provinces. Russia's determination to resist excessive Westernization by Ukraine, especially the possibility of Ukrainian membership in NATO, exceeded the willingness of the U.S. and its allies to reverse Putin's gains in Crimea.",

author = "Cimbala, {Stephen J.}",

year = "2014",

month = jul,

doi = "10.1080/13518046.2014.932623",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "27",

pages = "359--379",

journal = "Journal of Slavic Military Studies",

issn = "1351-8046",

publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21 February-18 March 2014

AU - Cimbala, Stephen J.

PY - 2014/7

Y1 - 2014/7

N2 - Vladimir Putin used a composite of ancient and modern methods of military persuasion in first destabilizing, and then annexing, Crimea in February and March of 2014. Putin's use of military persuasion through Russian and proxy forces enabled him to annex Crimea and to set the stage for further imposition of Russia's will on Ukraine's eastern provinces. Russia's determination to resist excessive Westernization by Ukraine, especially the possibility of Ukrainian membership in NATO, exceeded the willingness of the U.S. and its allies to reverse Putin's gains in Crimea.

AB - Vladimir Putin used a composite of ancient and modern methods of military persuasion in first destabilizing, and then annexing, Crimea in February and March of 2014. Putin's use of military persuasion through Russian and proxy forces enabled him to annex Crimea and to set the stage for further imposition of Russia's will on Ukraine's eastern provinces. Russia's determination to resist excessive Westernization by Ukraine, especially the possibility of Ukrainian membership in NATO, exceeded the willingness of the U.S. and its allies to reverse Putin's gains in Crimea.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84904692120&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84904692120&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/13518046.2014.932623

DO - 10.1080/13518046.2014.932623

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84904692120

VL - 27

SP - 359

EP - 379

JO - Journal of Slavic Military Studies

JF - Journal of Slavic Military Studies

SN - 1351-8046

IS - 3

ER -