The art of conversation: Eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication

Vijay Krishna, John Morgan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

87 Scopus citations

Abstract

We examine the strategic interaction between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker, extending the analysis of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50 (1982) 1431). We modify their model to allow for more extensive communication between the two parties and show that face-to-face communication between the expert and the uninformed decision maker followed by a written report from the expert leads to improved information transmission. In (almost) all cases, there exists an equilibrium in our modified model that ex ante Pareto dominates all of the equilibria identified by Crawford and Sobel. This remains true even if the expert's bias is so great that in their model no information would be disclosed.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)147-179
Number of pages33
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume117
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2004

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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