The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely

J. S. Jordan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

64 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper establishes that the competitive allocation process is the only informationally decentralized mechanism for exchange environments which (i) achieves Pareto optimal allocations; (ii) gives each consumer an allocation which is, according to his preferences, at least as good as his endowment; (iii) satisfies certain regularity conditions; and (iv) has a message space of the smallest dimension necessary to satisfy (i-iii).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-18
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume28
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1982

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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