The dynamic spillovers of entry

An application to the generic drug industry

Andrew Ronald Gallant, Han Hong, Ahmed Khwaja

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines whether experience from entry in one market can potentially enhance profitability at a future market opportunity for a related product. We formulate and estimate a dynamic game of entry in which forward-looking firms make decisions not just based on present benefits of past entry but also anticipating potential future benefits of current entry. Dynamic spillovers of entry are incorporated through a firm-specific unobservable (to the researcher) cost that depends on past entry decisions. The unobserved costs may also be serially persistent. Thus, the model allows for firmspecific unobserved heterogeneity that evolves based on firm actions. The challenge of estimating a dynamic game with serially correlated unobserved state variables subject to endogenous feedback is overcome by embedding a particle filter-based technique in a nested fixed-point algorithm. Using an application to a stylized model of entry in the generic pharmaceutical industry, we underscore the motivation for the model specification and the methodology developed. Our estimates imply positive spillover effects of entry. Moreover, these spillovers suggest heterogeneity not just across firms but also within firms over time based on their history of entry decisions. Our results illustrate that entry may potentially provide firms with additional strategic advantage in later markets and that entry spillovers may be an important factor to consider in the equilibrium evolution of the generic drug industry.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1189-1211
Number of pages23
JournalManagement Science
Volume64
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2018

Fingerprint

Spillover
Industry
Generic drugs
Costs
Dynamic games
State variable
Positive spillover
Unobserved heterogeneity
Factors
Methodology
Spillover effects
Particle filter
Fixed point
Strategic advantage
Model specification
Profitability
Pharmaceutical industry

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Cite this

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The dynamic spillovers of entry : An application to the generic drug industry. / Gallant, Andrew Ronald; Hong, Han; Khwaja, Ahmed.

In: Management Science, Vol. 64, No. 3, 01.03.2018, p. 1189-1211.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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