The effect of family ownership on corporate hedging

the case of Thailand

Sachapon Tungsong, Pornsit Jiraporn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We explore how corporate hedging decisions are affected by family ownership and control in Thailand. One crucial advantage of investigating this issue in Thailand is that hedging instruments became available only recently, long after families established their presence in the firm. Thus, endogeneity is much less likely. The evidence shows that family ownership by itself does not have a significant impact on the firm’s propensity to hedge. However, when family members have a presence on the board of directors, the firm is significantly more likely to engage in hedging activities. Furthermore, we find that the presence of institutional blockholders also increases the likelihood of hedging significantly. Our study is the first to examine the impact of family ownership and control on corporate hedging behaviour in an emerging market.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)882-887
Number of pages6
JournalApplied Economics Letters
Volume24
Issue number12
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 12 2017

Fingerprint

Family ownership
Thailand
Hedging
Corporate hedging
Family control
Ownership and control
Emerging markets
Board of directors
Blockholders
Endogeneity
Propensity
Hedge

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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The effect of family ownership on corporate hedging : the case of Thailand. / Tungsong, Sachapon; Jiraporn, Pornsit.

In: Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 24, No. 12, 12.07.2017, p. 882-887.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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