The interaction and sequencing of policy reforms

Jose Asturias, Sewon Hur, Timothy J. Kehoe, Kim Joseph Ruhl

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In what order should a developing country adopt policy reforms? Do some policies complement each other? Do others substitute for each other? To address these questions, we develop a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with entry and exit of firms that are monopolistic competitors. Distortions in the model include barriers to entry of firms, barriers to international trade, and barriers to contract enforcement. We find that a reform that reduces one of these distortions has different effects depending on the other distortions present. In particular, reforms to trade barriers and barriers to the entry of new firms are substitutes, as are reforms to contract enforcement and trade barriers. In contrast, reforms to contract enforcement and the barriers to entry are complements. Finally, the optimal sequencing of reforms requires reforming trade barriers before contract enforcement.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)45-66
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Volume72
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2016

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Sequencing
Interaction
International trade
Reforming reactions
Substitute
Developing countries
Complement
General Equilibrium
Policy
Policy reform
Equilibrium Model
Developing Countries
Contract enforcement
Trade barriers
Trade
Barriers to entry
Business

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Control and Optimization
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Asturias, Jose ; Hur, Sewon ; Kehoe, Timothy J. ; Ruhl, Kim Joseph. / The interaction and sequencing of policy reforms. In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 2016 ; Vol. 72. pp. 45-66.
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The interaction and sequencing of policy reforms. / Asturias, Jose; Hur, Sewon; Kehoe, Timothy J.; Ruhl, Kim Joseph.

In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 72, 01.11.2016, p. 45-66.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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