The political cost of public–private partnerships: Theory and evidence from Colombian infrastructure development

Maria Camila Angulo Amaya, Anthony Michael Bertelli, Eleanor Florence Woodhouse

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs) eschew traditional public management to provide distributive goods worldwide. Yet, in Colombia, the context of our study, both the promise of and voters' experience with PPPs hinder incumbent parties in elections when theories of distributive politics expect otherwise. We argue that negative experiences with PPPs introduce a sociotropic turn in individual voting: bad experience crowds out the possibility that promising a new project will improve a voter's own welfare. Studying what are, to our knowledge, all 109 Colombian PPP projects between 1998 and 2014, and over 8,700 individual survey responses, our evidence shows that vote intention for the incumbent executive or his party decreases as experience with more PPPs in respondents' districts increases. Our analysis and results introduce an important agenda for research into the political significance of these legacies of new public management.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)771-788
Number of pages18
JournalGovernance
Volume33
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2020

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration
  • Marketing

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The political cost of public–private partnerships: Theory and evidence from Colombian infrastructure development'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this