The production of electoral intimidation: Economic and political incentives

Isabela Mares, Boliang Zhu

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

This article presents an account of the conditions under which politicians engage in the production of electoral intimidation, by enlisting support from state employees and private actors. We characterize the political and economic factors that influence the cost-benefit calculations of these actors and their decisions to engage in the systematic harassment of voters. Empirically, our article examines the political and economic determinants of electoral irregularities in German elections during the period between 1870 and 1912. The most salient economic variable that affects the decision of private actors to engage in the electoral intimidation of voters is the occupational heterogeneity of a district. Other economic conditions in a district have no systematic effect on the incidence of electoral intimidation. We also find that political factors such as the level of electoral competition, strength of the political opposition, and the fragmentation among right parties affect the incidence of electoral irregularities.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)23-41
Number of pages19
JournalComparative Politics
Volume48
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2015

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

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